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Mergers and acquisitions are an important part of a 
firm’s future. When these transactions fail, as with 
CEO Carly Fiorina in 2005 with the HP-Compaq 
transaction, the CEO is sometimes fired and 
company value declines. Is there a way to prevent 
this from happening through executive 
compensation incentives? Specifically, could using 
long-term incentive pay reduce the risk involved in 
this type of investment? 
Long-term incentive plans (LTIP) encompass 
60% or more of a median S&P 500 CEO’s 
compensation package. In the United States during 
the early 1980s, firms with LTIP had higher ROE 
than those without them. By 1985, almost all large 
companies had LTIP (Leonard, 1990). LTIP had an 
increase in usage in 2004 after the passage of SFAS 
123R, which incentivized firms to move from 
employee stock options (ESOs) to restricted stock 
and LTIP (Brown and Lee, 2011). These conditional 
company shares distribute in two parts. The CEO 
receives half of the shares immediately, followed by 
the remainder three years later. The CEO receives 
this portion only if he remains with the company, 
and the company continues to exist. One of the main 
differences between deferred equity compensation 
and pension plans is what occurs in the event of 
bankruptcy. The CEO receives a percentage of his 
pension upon company bankruptcy, but the deferred 
equity compensation value becomes zero since the 
remaining portion of shares becomes worthless. 
Thus, it is important to investigate the effects of 
delayed stock and option grants, since the majority 
of the literature has focused on immediate stock and 
option compensation (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; 
Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Guay, 
1999; Core and Guay, 1999, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). 
To gain further insight as to how inside debt 
can affect CEO investment and financing policy, this 
paper analyzes the significant investment decisions 
reflected in domestic M&A transactions from 1996 
to 2005 for a total of 17,668 firm-year observations. 
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This paper analyzes the CEO incentives of inside debt in the form 
of deferred equity compensation in the context of M&A decisions. 
This study runs statistical regressions on the likelihood of a 
merger, whether the deal is diversifying, how much stock is used 
to pay for the deal, and the relative deal size controlling for CEO 
long-term incentive pay as the main variable of interest and 
including controls for firm characteristics, merger characteristics, 
industry, and year. This paper sheds light on LTIP effects before 
compensation changes occur after an M&A event. 
This study uses archival data from 1996 to 2005 for the United 
States with data collected from CRSP, Compustat, and SDC 
Platinum. This is one of the first studies to focus on the United 
States. 
When firms with higher levels of CEO long-term incentive pay 
decide to engage in an acquisition, those acquisitions are non-
diversifying, relatively smaller deals, and are paid using a greater 
portion of stock. The evidence indicates that long-term incentive 
pay incentivizes CEOs to make less risky decisions for the benefit 
of debt holders and at the expense of shareholders. In addition, 
deals made are not necessarily diversifying as once believed. 
 
Keywords: Executive Compensation, Inside Debt, Acquisitions and 
Mergers, Risk Management, Long-Term Incentive Plans 
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making an acquisition along with various aspects of 
the investment decision such as diversification, 
payment, and relative deal value to understand 
better the role of inside debt on the decision-making 
process of a CEO.  
These findings contribute to the literature in 
several ways. First, this paper further extends the 
literature on the use of CEO inside debt in executive 
compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei 
and Yermack, 2011). CEO inside debt is becoming a 
larger portion of compensation, which makes it 
important to better understand how it incentives 
CEOs and their risk taking actions. Second, this 
paper extends the definition of investing activities 
outside the scope of R&D and working capital 
(Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Rauh, 2006; Cassell 
et al., 2012) by using another type of investment: 
M&A, which provides additional data and a more in-
depth look at specific decisions a CEO can make.  
Third, this paper contributes to our understanding 
of LTIP in the United States. Other studies have 
focused on LTIP in other countries, such as Canada 
(Bodolica et al., 2007), Germany (Hinerlich, 2014), 
Great Britain (Stathopoulos et al., 2004; Ozkan, 
2011), and South Africa (Bussin and Blair, 2015). 
Finally, this paper ties together CEO incentives in 
M&A (Lehn and Zhao (2006)) by using CEO inside 
debt versus stock (see Core and Guay, 1999). The 
relative proportion of stock options and inside debt 
used to pay the CEO will affect his incentives and 
decision-making on important M&A decisions.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows: section two provides a literature review 
from which hypotheses are developed and proposed. 
Section three describes the data and methodology 
used to create results in section four. Section five 
concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The literature on executive compensation has largely 
concentrated on equity holdings. Pay-for-
performance incentives align managerial interests 
with shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; 
Mehran, 1995), although boards in charge of this 
compensation tend to be reactive rather than 
proactive when it comes to dealing with agency 
issues (Bodolica and Spraggon, 2009). However, in 
recent years, the literature has expanded to include 
CEO debt holdings, such as deferred compensation 
and pensions, otherwise known as inside debt. 
Changes in LTIP are significantly associated with 
claims of other stakeholders, including customers 
and employees (Arora and Alam, 2005).  Edmans and 
Liu (2010) point out that a CEO compensation 
scheme contains both equity and debt and therefore 
it is important to recognize the incentives arising 
from the debt component of their compensation. 
Consequently, a manager’s personal leverage, 
defined as debt over equity holdings, can greatly 
affect firm risk. For example, empirically, Rauh 
(2006) finds firms with largely defined benefit 
pension obligations are constrained and choose to 
invest less due to this extensive debt burden. The 
resulting reduction in investments implies the firm 
has fewer opportunities to fail; thus, the firm risk is 
reduced.  
Cassell et al. (2012) expand the literature by 
focusing on CEO decisions concerning investments 
and financing. They find that large debt holdings by 
the CEO will lead him to reduce the firm risk for two 
reasons. First, if the CEO’s inside debt is greater than 
the CEO’s equity holdings; the CEO has a reduced 
incentive to increase wealth via stocks and stock 
options. Since the CEO can increase stock value by 
taking on higher risk in order to reap higher returns, 
when inside debt is greater than the equity 
incentives, the CEO has incentive to reduce risk 
rather than increase it. Second, increasing deferred 
compensation increases the incentive for the CEO to 
make decisions which will make the firm last after 
his retirement or departure in order for him to be 
fully compensated in later periods. Thus, the CEO 
will make decisions to reduce the likelihood of 
bankruptcy and to increase the long-run viability of 
the firm. Consistent with this, Cassell et al. (2012) 
find increases in CEO inside debt reduce stock 
return volatility, a measure of firm risk. Mergers and 
Acquisitions represent a specific firm investment 
that can be risk increasing (Langetieg, 1978; 
Malatesta, 1983; Asquith, 1983; Roll, 1986; Agrawal 
et al., 1992; Anderson and Mandelker, 1993; 
Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Mitchell and Stafford, 
1998). If greater inside debt predisposes a CEO to 
avoid risky firm investments, then the CEO can view 
the M&A as too risky, despite the potential of it 
yielding positive NPV.  
Hypothesis 1: CEO LTIP are negatively 
associated with the likelihood of an M&A. 
The CEO of acquiring firms can target similar 
firms in the same industry with the intention to 
reduce risk by reducing market competition or to 
further enhance the company’s current operations. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find returns to 
bidding shareholders are lower when firms diversify 
due to the reduction in risk. Firms deciding to 
branch out into other industries take on integration 
risk and increase the risk of potential failure if the 
venture does not work well with the current 
synergies of the firm. Conversely, future firm 
performance as measured by stock returns is higher 
for firms who have a within-industry acquisition 
(Uysal, 2011). Thus, the CEO will choose targets that 
can be more easily integrated and that can enhance 
the current operations of the company in the 
context of the acquiring firm’s current industry. This 
will lower the chance of firm bankruptcy and 
increase the likelihood his deferred compensation 
will be paid in the future.  
Hypothesis 2: When firms with increasing levels 
of CEO LTIP decide to engage in an acquisition, those 
acquisitions are less likely to be diversifying. 
Liquidity in the form of cash needs to be 
readily available for firms, especially for those with 
large debt obligations in the form of deferred 
compensation and pensions for executives. Thus, 
paying with cash or incurring additional debt to 
acquire a target is less attractive for CEOs with high 
inside debt and thus they likely prefer to acquire 
with stock in order to reduce the debt-to-equity ratio 
of the firm. This is an additional incentive for stock 
acquisitions beyond the stock being undervalued 
relative to the bidder (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Not incurring debt and acquiring with stock provides 
the firm with more liquidity and a potentially better 
credit rating, which reduces bankruptcy risk. One 
could also argue about tax incentives, but executive 
compensation in the form of salary, qualified stock, 
LTIP, and bonuses paid after retirement have little 
effect on marginal tax rates due to equality concerns 
(Frydman and Molloy, 2009). 
Hypothesis 3: The acquisition payment in stock 
increases as CEO LTIP increases. 
Finally, the target firm size is also related to 
integration risk as smaller firms are easier to 
integrate than are larger firms. This immediate 
short-term risk may drive CEOs to choose a smaller 
target so as to not jeopardize the livelihood of the 
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firm, since acquiring a larger firm can lead to long-
run sustainability concerns if integration fails.  
Hypothesis 4: CEO LTIP is negatively associated 
with relative acquiring deal values.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Executive compensation is obtained from 
Execucomp. The data is screened for only CEOs 
using the ceoann variable. Company financials are 
from the CRSP/Compustat merged database 
provided by WRDS. Merger and acquisition data are 
from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. Governance 
and board controls are from Risk Metrics. The 
following restrictions minimize the dataset. The 
transactions are domestic (U.S.) only. The 
announcement date must occur between 1996 and 
2005. The acquirer must have public status. The deal 
must be completed and unconditional. The percent 
of shares owned before (after) the transaction must 
be less than (equal to) 50% (100%). The percent of 
shares the acquirer seeks to own must be equal to 
100%. The deal value must be greater than 10 
million. Two-digit SIC codes 49 (utilities) and 60-67 
(financial firms) are excluded due to government 
regulation restrictions, especially on debt and equity 
issues. The final sample results in 17,668 firm-year 
observations with 3,872 merger or acquisition 
transactions.  
Note, the security of the CEO debt (whether the 
pension is funded or guaranteed) is not considered 
here due to lack of data. This may affect the CEO’s 
riskiness if the debt is guaranteed, irrespective of 
the firm’s future existence. If this were the case, it 
would be easier to take a greater risk on the equity 
side. This would increase instead of mitigating the 
agency cost of debt, which is one reason to defer 
compensation. Secured debt would bias against my 
finding significant results. In data available after 
2006 due to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission adopting changes to disclosure 
requirements concerning the summary 
compensation table, additional information is 
provided concerning whether executive pensions are 
unfunded and unsecured, like supplemental 
executive retirement plans (SERPs), whether funds 
are funded and secured, like rank-and-file (RAF) 
plans, or other deferred compensation (ODC) that 
can be invested in stock and withdrawn before 
retirement (Anantharaman et al. 2014).  
 This paper tests the theory of Edmans and Liu 
(2011), who argue inside debt increases lead to 
conservative decisions and build on the agency 
theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that firms 
should finance the CEO in the same manner as the 
firm in order to properly align incentives and reduce 
agency costs. The main independent variables of 
interest are the log of CEO to firm debt/equity ratio 
(CEO RDE) and the log of CEO relative incentive ratio 
(CEO RIR). In theory, both CEO RDE and CEO RIR 
would be optimal at one. CEO RDE is the ratio of the 
CEO’s inside debt to the firm’s debt, where the CEO 
has debt in the form of pension benefits and 
deferred compensation and equity in the form of 
stock and stock options (valued by Black and 
Scholes, 1973), and the firm has current and long-
term debt and equity valued by the market. This is 
equal to [(CEO IDH / CEO EH)/(FD / FE)], where CEO 
IDH is the aggregated present value of pension 
benefits and deferred compensation, CEO EH is the 
value of stock (fiscal year-end stock price multiplied 
by the number of shares held (including restricted)) 
and stock options (Black-Scholes valuation of the 
newly granted, exercisable, and unexercisable 
tranches), FD is total current liabilities and long-term 
debt, and FE is the current number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the fiscal-year end stock 
price. The formula is:  
 
    
                     (                            
                    
)
        
          
 (1) 
 
Some firms do not have debt (Agrawal and 
Nagarajan, 1990). This paper initializes such cases to 
zero. This is not an issue for equity since our sample 
contains public firms in the S&P 1500. CEO RIR is 
the ratio of the CEO relative incentive ratio 
established by Wei and Yermack (2011), where the 
CEO has debt in the form of pension benefits and 
deferred compensation and equity in the form of 
stock and stock options (valued according to option 
delta by exercisability tranches  by Black and 
Scholes, 1973, as defined below) and the firm has 
current liabilities and long-term debt and equity 
options (valued by total employee options, the 
average outstanding exercise price, and assumed 
expiration of 4 years).  
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where N is the cumulative normal distribution 
function, S is the underlying stock price, X is the 
option exercise price,   is the expected stock-return 
volatility over the option life, r is the natural 
logarithm of the risk-free rate, T is the time-to-
maturity in years, and d is the natural logarithm of 
the dividend yield. This paper follows Core and Guay 
(2002) in estimating T and X. Unexercised 
unexercisable (exercisable) options have T-1 (T-3) 
fewer years than previously granted options. If no 
options are granted in the previous year than T=9 
(T=6) for unexercisable (exercisable) options. The 
exercise price is calculated as the difference between 
the end-of-year stock price and the average value 
(i.e. realizable value of previously granted options 
divided by the number of options unexercised). The 
formula for CEO RIR is:  
 
    
                     ∑                     
 
 
        
                
 (4) 
 
This paper uses several controls for both the 
CEO and the firm. Morse, Nanda, and Seru (2010) 
find powerful CEOs rig their incentive contracts. 
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) find CEO 
attributes and types of compensation affect the 
financial decisions they make.  Thus, CEO controls 
are essential to the executive compensation analysis. 
Control variables specific to the CEO include age, a 
gender indicator if the CEO is male, an indicator if 
the CEO was the Chairman of the Board, the length 
of tenure the CEO has with the current firm, and the 
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percent of shares the CEO owns (excluding options) 
relative to the entire market. 
 Carlson and Lazrak (2010) find a positive 
association between manager’s pay sensitivity in the 
form of cash to stock and the firm’s leverage ratios. 
Harford and Li (2007) find CEO wealth becomes 
insensitive to poor performance after a merger if 
board governance is weak. Control variables specific 
to the firm include a measure of size via the natural 
logarithm of assets, leverage defined as total firm 
debt scaled by total firm assets, contemporaneous 
and the lag of total shareholder return (including 
dividends), the G-index as a measure of governance 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), the age of the 
firm according to its IPO date, the board size, and 
the percentage of board members classified as 
independent from the firm. This paper uses Fama-
French 48 industry classifications from Kenneth 
French’s website and year fixed effects to account 
for industry differences in valuation dispersion 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).  
Finally, merger variables include the value of 
the deal completed between the acquirer and target, 
the percentages of stock and cash used in the 
transaction, an indicator if the transaction is a 
merger of equals, an indicator if the target firm is 
private, public, or a subsidiary, interactions among 
public status and if the deal was completed 
completely in cash, an indicator if there were 
multiple bidders, an indicator if the target firm has 
defensive provisions, an indicator if a tender offer is 
made, and an indicator if the M&A was unsolicited. 
The summary statistics are provided in Table 1. 
Panel A describes the whole sample of 17,668 
firm-year observations. CEO RDE averages –2.721, 
which is higher than the CEO RIR mean of –7.499. 
The means of the variables of interest are lower than 
the values reported in Cassell et al. (2012) due to 
variable calculations over several market highs and 
lows versus the market’s record high in 2006 used 
by Cassell et al. Firm reporting requirements for 
inside CEO debt did not become fully regulated until 
after the defined benefit crisis in 2003 and the SEC 
disclosure requirement came into effect in 2006. 
There are slightly fewer observations for the CEO 
RIR since the calculation requires more data to 
calculate the option value using CEO delta. The 
average CEO age is 56 years old, with the youngest 
in the sample at 32 and the oldest at 91 years. 98.5% 
of the CEOs in our sample are male. Sixty-seven 
percent of CEOs also serve as Chairman of the 
Board. The mean and median firm tenure of the CEO 
is 8 and 7 years, respectively. The average CEO owns 
3% of the company’s total shares (excluding options). 
The average firm has assets of $7.4 billion, a 
leverage ratio of 0.42, a G-index of 9.5, firm age of 
11 years, 10 members of the Board of Directors, and 




Table 1. Summary Statistics 
  
Panel A: Full Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Variables of Interest 
CEO RDE 17668 -2.721 2.330 -20.008 -2.849 11.854 
CEO RIR 10696 -7.499 4.961 -31.914 -7.858 22.131 
CEO Controls 
Age 17241 56.224 7.188 32 56 91 
Gender 17668 0.985 0.121 0 1 1 
Chairman 17668 0.669 0.470 0 1 1 
CEO Tenure 17668 7.729 7.047 0 6 61 
CEO Ownership 17668 0.029 0.125 0 0.011 12.955 
Firm Controls 
Assets 17668 7357.64 21559.05 16.767 1783.13 697239 
Leverage 17668 0.419 3.372 -73.171 0.357 253.307 
Return
t
 17537 16.195 58.135 -97.672 9.491 1304.094 
Return
t-1
 17496 18.411 55.587 -94.009 12.993 1304.094 
G-index 17401 9.514 2.637 2 10 18 
Firm Age 17668 11.243 4.933 0 11 38 
Board Size 17668 9.693 2.559 3 9 26 
Board Independence 17641 65.432 17.190 7.692 66.667 100 
 
Panel B: Merger Sample (Part1) 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Median Maximum 
Variables of Interest 
CEO RDE 3872 -2.834 2.243 -19.589 -2.947 6.625 
CEO RIR 2352 -7.525 4.845 -19.908 -8.273 22.131 
CEO Controls 
Age 4151 55.805 7.165 34 56 84 
Gender 4229 0.986 0.118 0 1 1 
Chairman 4229 0.663 0.473 0 1 1 
CEO Tenure 4229 8.019 6.983 0 7 46 
CEO Ownership 4229 0.028 0.206 0 0.01 12.955 
Firm Controls 
Assets 4213 8865.683 22494.47 49.904 2393.12 437006 
Leverage 4229 0.335 0.255 0 0.34 4.893 
Return
t
 4213 20.126 68.313 -97.672 11.888 1304.094 
Return
t-1
 4206 26.315 65.159 -89.572 19.760 1772.631 
G-index 4163 9.507 2.701 2 9 18 
Firm Age 4229 11.269 4.931 0 11 36 
Board Size 4229 9.638 2.551 4 10 26 
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Panel B: Merger Sample (Part2) 
 
Merger Variables 
Deal Value 4219 670.799 3327.673 10 114.942 89167.72 
Of Stock 1244 77.152 28.582 1.84 94.505 100 
Merger of Equals 4229 0.001 0.034 0 0 1 
Private 4229 0.356 0.479 0 0 1 
Public 4229 0.272 0.445 0 0 1 
Subsidiary 4219 0.368 0.482 0 0 1 
Of Cash 2241 86.156 25.289 0 100 100 
Number of Bidders 4229 0.019 0.136 0 0 1 
Defensive Provisions 4229 0.040 0.194 0 0 1 
Tender Offer 4229 0.080 0.271 0 0 1 
Hostile 4229 0.019 0.135 0 0 1 
Public * Cash 4229 0.085 0.278 0 0 1 
Public * Stock 4229 0.073 0.260 0 0 1 
Private * Cash 4229 0.118 0.323 0 0 1 
Private * Stock 4229 0.060 0.238 0 0 1 
Subsidiary * Cash 4229 0.154 0.361 0 0 1 
Note: This table provides summary statistics on 17,668 firm-year observations, including 3,872 merger transactions from 1996 
to 2005. Variable descriptions are described in the appendix.  Panel A describes the full sample of firms, including those who did not 
have a merger transaction. Panel B describes the sample of firms who had mergers.  
 
Panel B describes the sample of 3,872 mergers 
and acquisitions. The average age for the acquiring 
CEO is 56 years old, and 98.6% are male. They serve 
as Chairman 66.3% of the time, have a tenure of 8 
years, and own 2.8% of total firm shares (excluding 
options). The average firm has $8.9 billion in assets, 
a leverage ratio of 0.34, a G-index of 9.5, and an 
average firm age of 11. The Board of Directors 
averages 10 members, 66.2% of whom are 
independent from the firm. The average merger has 
a value of $671 million with 22.7% of the purchase in 
stock. There are only seven transactions classified as 
a merger of equals, and 35.6% of the target firms are 
private. Comparing Panels A and B, this paper find 
the merger sample has (on average) lower inside 
debt. The acquiring firm is larger according to its 
assets and has less contemporaneous return. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2. Merger likelihood association with CEO LTIP 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 





































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 
Observations 16252 9882 16178 9857 15798 9665 
Note: This table provides analysis on the likelihood of a merger given the presence of CEO LTIP. This is logistic regression 
analysis. The dependent variable is an indicator if a merger transaction occurred with the firm in a given year. See the appendix for 
variable definitions. Industry controls are also provided using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Year fixed effects are 
included in all models. All errors in brackets are clustered by firm.  Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
This paper begins by analyzing the association 
between inside debt and the probability of an M&A. 
Table 2 analyzes the likelihood of a merger in the 
presence of inside debt. All analyses calculate 
standard errors with a robust heteroskedasticity 
covariance matrix and firm clustering. In each panel, 
this paper report models using both measures of 
CEO inside debt first with only CEO controls, second 
with only firm controls and then third both CEO and 
firm controls. Panel A contains logistic regressions 
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of the full sample, where the dependent variable is 
an indicator if a merger occurred in the year. CEO 
RDE has a consistent and statistically negative 
coefficient in all models, which means higher CEO 
inside debt is associated with a lower probability of 
the firm initiating an acquisition. CEO RDE goes 
from -0.043 with only firm controls to -0.052 in the 
models with CEO controls only and both CEO and 
firm controls, respectively.  CEO RIR is negative but 
statistically insignificant in all models. CEO RIR goes 
from -0.012 with only CEO controls to -0.004 with 
only firm controls to -0.008 with both firm and CEO 
controls. The coefficient on Model 5 is interpreted as 
a 1 % increase in the standard deviation of the log of 
CEO RDE decreases the M&A propensity by 12.5%. 
Other controls indicate larger firms tend to acquire 
or merge less often than smaller size firms. Firms 
with higher shareholder returns in the current or 
previous year are more likely to acquire. Firms with 
more independent boards are more likely to engage 
in an M&A. In the full model with CEO RDE, 8 % of 
the variation is explained by the model. 
 
Table 3. Diversification and acquirer LTIP 
 
Note: This table provides analysis of logistic models on the diversification choice of a target given the presence of CEO LTIP. The dependent 
variable is an indicator if the acquirer and target have a different Fama-French 12 industry classification. See the appendix for variable 
definitions. Year and industry controls using the Fama-French 48 industry classifications are included in all models. All errors in brackets are 
clustered by firm. Significance is depicted by 
*, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 















































































































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.23 
Observations 3607 2216 3584 2192 3519 2167 
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The next series of tests analyze specific merger 
decisions. Table 3 presents logistic regressions of 
diversification. The dependent variable is an 
indicator of diversification using two-digit SIC codes. 
If the acquiring firm and target firm have a different 
two-digit SIC code, the indicator becomes a one, zero 
otherwise.  Independent variables are inside debt 
measures and controls pertaining to the CEO, firm, 
and the merger itself. The Pseudo-R2 of all 
regressions falls between 13 % and 23 %. This paper 
finds CEO RIR is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1 % level for all models. A one-percent 
increase in CEO RIR decreases the likelihood of 
diversification by 6.4 %. Thus, firms who pay their 
CEOs with more inside debt tend to err on the side 
of synergy versus diversification in improving the 
firm through M&A investment. Firms with CEOs who 
have lower tenure and more ownership tend to 
diversify more. Firms with higher lagged leverage, a 
higher g-index, and more members on the board 
tend to choose targets with a different two-digit SIC. 
Acquirers tend to use less cash for diversifying 
mergers, and they choose subsidiaries to gain 
diversification benefits. In unreported results, this 
paper tests diversification using other measures, 
such as Fama-French 12 and 48 industry 
classifications, as well as one-digit, three-digit, and 
four-digit SIC codes. This paper finds similar results 
for CEO RDE using FF12 and CEO RIR using FF48, 
one-digit, three-digit, and four-digit SIC codes. 
 
Table 4. Stock payment in the presence of CEO LTIP 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 



























































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 
Observations 3607 2216 3584 2192 3519 2167 
Note: This table provides analysis of Tobit models on the proportion of stock used in making a payment for the merger given the 
presence of CEO LTIP in the sample period from 1996 to 2006. The dependent variable is the percentage of stock used as payment in 
the merger transaction. Merger controls include if the transaction is considered a merger of equals and an indicator if the target firm 
is private. See the appendix for variable definitions. Industry controls are also provided using the Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Year fixed effects are included in all models. All errors in brackets are clustered by firm. Significance is depicted by *, **, 
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The next merger decision involves the 
proportion of acquisition payment in stock. Table 4 
analyzes inside debt on the firm’s decisions of how 
to pay for the merger or acquisition using double-
sided censored Tobit regressions since some firms 
cannot use stock due to a low supply or other firm 
constraints. The upper and lower limits are 100% 
and 0%, respectively. In this analysis, this paper does 
not include proportions of stock and cash or 
interactions between them and the public status 
indicators due to multicollinearity concerns. In the 
full specifications, this paper finds both CEO RDE 
and CEO RIR are statistically positive and significant 
at the 1 % level. A one-standard deviation increase in 
CEO RDE (CEO RIR) increases the proportion of stock 
used by 12.2 % (5.2 %). With respect to the full 
models, CEOs are more likely to use stock if they are 
older, male, not the Chairman, have more tenure, 
and own more stock in the company. Firms are more 
likely to use stock to pay for an M&A if lagged 
leverage is higher, the contemporaneous return is 
lower, lagged return is higher, board size is larger, 
and board independence is lower. Acquisitions are 
more likely to have stock payments if the M&A is a 
merger of equal, has more bidders and defensive 
provisions, and is considered hostile. The stock is 
used to acquiring private and subsidiary targets, 
whereas cash is preferred for public acquisitions. 
Finally, this paper analyzes how relative deal 
value is affected by inside CEO debt. Table 5 models 
CEO inside debt on deal value scaled by the 
acquirer’s market value to measure the size effect in 
the presence of inside debt. Using OLS, the full 
model of CEO RDE explains 28 % of the variation. 
This paper finds CEO RDE is negative and significant 
in all models. According to model 5, a 1 % increase 
in CEO RDE decreases relative deal value by 1.5 %. A 
one-standard deviation increase in CEO RDE 
decreases relative deal value by 3.4 %. Older CEOs 
tend to choose lower-sized targets. Firms with larger 
size, lower contemporaneous return, and lower 
board size engage in relatively smaller deals. 
Mergers are larger if it is considered a merger of 
equals, has fewer bidders, is not a tender offer, and 
is considered hostile. Targets are larger if stock is 
used more relative to cash. Private cash deals are 




Pensions and deferred compensation incentivize 
CEOs to take into consideration the long-term 
effects of their decisions. Using measures similar to 
the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, this paper find CEOs 
who are paid with relatively more debt than the firm 
uses tend to act safely and choose to engage in 
fewer M&A, which are deemed risky investments. 
When CEOs do decide to choose this investment 
channel, the investments they make tend to be risk 
reducing. They pick smaller target firms in the same 
industry as their firm. Unlike previous thinking, they 
engage in fewer deals that diversify the nature of the 
firm. The deals tend to be targeted toward weeding 
out competition and not focused for example on 
supply-chain integration. They use a higher 
proportion of stock and less cash for these deals. 
These findings suggest the optimal CEO debt-to-
equity ratio with respect to his compensation should 
be close to one in order to mitigate agency conflicts 
between bondholders and stockholders. In fact, Phan 
(2014) finds restructuring of compensation to mirror 
capital structure occurs after a merger. 
 
 
Table 5. Deal value in the presence of CEO LTIP (Part 1) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
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Table 5. Deal value in the presence of CEO LTIP (Part 2) 
 
Merger Controls 



































































































































































R2 3607 2216 3584 2192 3519 2167 
Observations 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.28 
Note: This table provides analysis of ordinary least squares (OLS) models on the value of the merger deal  (according  to  SDC  
Platinum)  given  the  presence  of  CEO  inside  debt.  The dependent variable is the deal value scaled by the acquirer’s market value 
of equity. See Table 4 or the Appendix for variable definitions. Year fixed effects are included in all models. All errors in brackets are 
clustered by firm. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Despite these major findings, there are some 
limitations to the research. First, LTIP is no longer 
collected due to improved disclosure requirements 
in the U.S. after 2006. Second, new data can help 
discern more detailed information about what is 
truly debt-like compensation versus equity-like 
compensation, although this strengthens my results 
since this fact reduces the probability of yielding 
any significance. Third, the paper does not focus on 
what happens to companies or CEO compensation 
after a merger occurs. If the LTIP was in the form of 
a SERP, future firm events, such as a repurchase, 
may have significant effects on compensation, 
especially if accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) or 
open market repurchases (OMRs) are allowed. An 
ASR paired with a higher SERP with salary and bonus 
from a higher EPS will yield higher compensation 
and incentivize CEOs to potentially engage in 
behaviors unfavorable to shareholders (Tan and 
Young, 2016). Lastly, due to lack of data during the 
time period used, the security of the debt is not 
available for investigation. 
Shareholders interested in future growth of the 
company through M&A should vote on CEO 
compensation packages with more equity and less 
debt to incentivize them to take more risk. Company 
financiers should be wary of issuing debt 
instruments to companies with CEOs who are paid 
with more stock than debt since the CEOs are 
incentivized to take more risk, which could 
negatively impact the guaranteed returns of the 
bondholders. To reduce agency conflicts, 
shareholders should invest in firms where CEOs are 
paid with more stock; bondholders should buy 
bonds from companies who pay their CEOs with 
more debt. Greater inside debt incentivizes CEOs to 
make less risky decisions. M&A research should 
control for CEO compensation variability, including 
the relative proportion of CEO debt-to-equity to firm 
debt-to-equity as this has been shown in this paper’s 
sample and others how it affects CEO’s decision-
making. Future research can investigate CEO inside 
debt effects on other issues of investment and 
financing and if behaviors have changed pre- and 
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Age Age of the CEO 
Gender Indicator if the CEO is male 
Log (Assets) Natural log of the total assets of the acquiring firm 
CEO RDE     
                     (                            
                    
)
        
          
 
Natural log of the CEO’s inside debt to the firm’s debt established by Cassell et al. (2012), where the CEO 
has debt in the form of pension benefits and deferred compensation and equity in the form of stock and 
stock options (valued by Black and Scholes (1973) and the firm has current liabilities and long-term debt 
and equity valued as the total number of common shares outstanding multiplied by the current market 
price at the end of the fiscal-year 
CEO RIR     
                     ∑                     
 
 
        
                
 
Natural log of the CEO relative incentive ratio established by Wei and Yermack (2011), where the CEO has 
debt in the form of pension benefits and deferred compensation and equity in the form of stock and stock 
options (valued according to option delta by exercisability tranches using Black-Scholes (1973)) and the firm 
has current and long-term debt and equity options (valued by total employee options, the average 
outstanding exercise price, and assumed expiration of 4 years). I = 1 to 3 for each type of option (exercised, 
unexercised exercisable, and unexercised unexercisable), optosey is the total number of employee options, 
and optprcby is the average exercise price. 
Of Stock Amount the acquirer pays for the target in stock 
Of Cash Amount the acquirer pays for the target in cash 
Merger of Equals Indicates if the transaction is a merger of equals 
Private Indicates if the target firm is private 
Public Indicates if the target firm is public 
Subsidiary Indicates if the target firm is a subsidiary 
Numbid Indicates if the number of bidders is greater than one 
Defenseprov Indicates if the target had defensive provisions against takeover 
Tender Indicates if there was a tender offer 
Hostile Indicates if the M&A was unsolicited 
Publiccash Indicates if the target was public and the deal was paid for completely in cash 
Publicstock Indicates if the target was public and the deal was paid for completely in stock 
Privatecash Indicates if the target was private and the deal was paid for completely in cash 
Privatestock Indicates if the target was private and the deal was paid for completely in stock 
Subcash Indicates if the target was a subsidiary and the deal was paid for 100% in cash 
G-index G-index from Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
CEO Ownership Percentage of shares owned (excluding options) by the CEO 
Firm Age Age of the firm in years as calculated from the IPO date 
CEO Tenure CEO length of employment in years with the current firm 
Return
t
 Total shareholder return for year t (including dividends) 
Chairman Indicates if the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board of Directors 
Leverage (dltt + dlc) / at 
Board Size Total number of persons on the Board of Directors 
Board Independence Percentage of board directors independent of the firm 
Acquisitions Aqc / at  
 
